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The close relationship between a mutual fund and its management
company has long generated fears concerning the size of fees paid to
the management company for investment advice.' The original regu-
latory approach relied upon disclosure and a degree of shareholder
participation in the fund's decisionmaking process.2 The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Congress reacted to subsequent
undesirable fee arrangements in management contracts by changing
the regulatory strategy altogether. Congress established a standardized
fee structure3 and placed upon courts the task of supervising fees. 4
These changes, made in 1970, have serious shortcomings and were
undertaken prematurely. A system of shareholder control and mean-
ingful disclosure had not been fully developed, and the shift in strategy
was unwarranted.
I. Regulation of Mutual Fund Advisory Fees
A mutual fund' is usually organized by persons or corporations
which are interested in providing it with management and research
services.( The fund, while under the control of the incorporators and
original shareholders, enters into management and research agree-
ments with these same persons. Once the fund undertakes to offer its
1. Note, The Mutual Fund and Its Management Company: An Analysis of Business
Incest, 71 YALE L.J. 137 (1961).
2. See p. 1476 infra.
3. Investment Advisers Act § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as § 2053.
4. Investment Company Act § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited
as § 36(b)].
5. Mutual funds are publicly held corporations which engage only in such activity
as is necessary to the distribution of their own shares and the management of their
portfolio. Although not an essential characteristic, almost all funds are diversified.
SEC, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH,
H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PPI]. Diver-
sification is defined to mean that 75 percent of the company's assets are invested in
cash and securities, that no greater than 5 percent of the fund's assets are invested
in the securities of one issuer, and that the company owns no more than 10 percent
of the outstanding voting stock of one issuer. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 80a-5(b)(1) (1970). Open-ended mutual funds have outstanding redeemable shares,
id. § 80a-5(a)(l), and engage in a continuous offering of their shares at a price de-
termined by the size of their portfolio and the number of shares outstanding. 17
C.F.R. § 270.22c-l(a) (1973). For a definition of net assets for these purposes, see SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 5569 (Jan. 10, 1969).
6. This process is explained in detail in Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural
Analysis, 47 VA. L. REv. 181 (1961).
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shares publicly, it becomes subject to the regulatory requirements of
the Investment Company Act.7 The fund and its adviser must also
comply with the regulatory provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, s
the Securities Exchange Act,9 and the Investment Advisers Act.'0
A. Pre4970 Regulatory Scheme
Prior to the 1970 Amendments" to the Investment Company Act
and the Investment Advisers Act, regulation of fees paid to the com-
panies providing advisory and management services for a fund took
two forms. One type of regulation sought to maintain shareholder
control over the awarding by the fund of these management and ad-
visory contracts. The Investment Advisers Act requires stockholder
approval of new contracts with an investment adviser and approval
of renewals of advisory contracts by a majority of the noninterested
directors or a majority of the stockholders. 12 The Act also requires
stockholder election of all the directors over a five year period. 13
The second type of pre-1970 regulation of mutual funds involved
disclosure requirements. These attempted to enhance competition
among fund managers by providing information to shareholders and
potential shareholders about the benefits of the fund received in re-
turn for the advisory and management fees paid. Disclosure was tied
as well to shareholder participation in the corporate decisionmaking
process. An enlightened and rational vote requires information about
the advisory contracts and the quantity and quality of services pro-
vided to the fund.'
4
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970).
8. Id. §§ 77a-77bbbb.
9. Id. §§ 78a-78hh-1.
10. Id. §§ 80a-1 to -52.
11. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413. For the complete
statutes with amendments, see notes 34 supra.
12. For new contracts, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970). For renewal of contracts,
see id. §§ 80a-l5(a)(2) & -15(c). The Investment Company Act also requires that at
least 40 percent of the fund's board consist of noninterested directors, id. § 80a-10(a).
"Interested person" as defined in § 2(a)(19), id. § 80a-2(a)(19), includes, among others,
affiliated persons, family members of such persons, and those persons having a material
business relationship in the last two years with the company, the principal under-
writer, or the principal executive officers of the company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) con-
tains a more complex set of rules limiting the number of fund directors who are
brokers or persons affiliated with brokers for the fund; underwriters or interested
persons of the principal underwriters for the fund; or affiliated persons of any in-
vestment bankers when any such persons serve as either directors, officers, or employees
of the fund. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(c) limits the number of directors of a fund who are
officers, directors, or employees of one bank. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d) exempts certain
no-load companies from § 10(a) and § 10(b)(2) except that there must be at least
one noninterested director.
13. Id. § 80a-16(a).
14. Cf. Schotland, Changes in Disclosure, Bus. LAw., Mar. 1974, at 31, 39 (special
issue).
1476
Vol. 83: 1475, 1974
Mutual Funds and Their Advisers
While the pre-1970 regulatory scheme was in effect, the SEC no-
ticed what it considered undesirable industry fee patterns: Investment
advisory fees were generally calculated as a fixed percentage of asset
size even though there were significant economies of scale to manage-
ment and provision of advice.' 5 Investors were not reaping the rewards
of these lowered costs of management of large portfolios.' 6
Congress was also convinced that certain performance fee arrange-
ments were encouraging excessive risk taking and inflated fees.17
These arrangements rewarded the advisory company with a fee bonus
when the performance of the portfolio of the fund company exceeded
a sometimes irrelevant index and often provided no penalty for per-
formance of the fund portfolio below the chosen index.' 8 Indexes for
comparison could be selected which would provide rewards when the
fund's value increased with a general market rise although such in-
creases in portfolio value might have no relationship to the advising
capabilities of the fund's advisory company.
B. The 1970 Amendments
The major congressional responses' 9 to the SEC's petition for
change were the addition of § 36(b) to the Investment Company Act2 0
and the amendment of § 205 of the Investment Advisers Act.2' These
two provisions approach the problem of excessive fees in two different
ways: Section 36(b) embodies a new fiduciary duty concept; section
205 establishes a performance fee structure. Neither assures an arm's
length advisory fee.
1. Section 36(b)
Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act imposes a fiduciary
duty22 on investment advisers and their affiliates with respect to fees
15. See PPI, supra note 5, at 11, 102.
16. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
184].
17. Id. at 45; SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doe. No. 64, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ISR].
18. For a detailed description of these arrangements, see ISR, supra note 17, at 254-66.
19. A minor change, § 15(c) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c)(1970), provides that the directors of a registered company shall have the duty to
request and evaluate, and the adviser to the company the duty to furnish, information
necessary to evaluate the advisory contract. This provision does not appear to limit the
terms of an advisory contract. See S. REP. No. 184, supra note 16, at 7. It may, how-
ever, give shareholders judicially enforceable rights against directors who fail to evaluate
the advisory contract; cf. Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 1961); Propp
v. Sadacca, 40 Del. Ch. 113, 175 A.2d 33 (1961).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
21. Id. § 80b.5.
22. An interesting attempt to define this duty has been made in Note, Mutual
Fund Advisory Fees and the New Standard of Fiduciary Duty-Interpreting the 1970
Mutual Fund Act, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 627 (1971).
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received from an investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act, or from its security holders. For breach of this duty a
lawsuit may be brought by a shareholder on behalf of the company
against the person accepting such fees.23 Misconduct of the defendant
need not be proved in order to establish a breach of duty.24 The
thrust of the provision is, thus, to regulate fees, not misconduct.
Section 36(b) embodies a more stringent standard than that em-
ployed by most state courts. In its report to Congress, the SEC, after
a review of relevant cases, 25 concluded that the state courts did not
take into account the domination of mutual funds by advisory com-
panies in suits alleging that unreasonably high fees were paid by the
satellite mutual funds to their investment advisers.26 The SEC's solu-
tion to this problem would have required that fees paid to an invest-
ment adviser of an investment company be reasonable.2 7
Although Congress did not adopt the SEC's suggested reasonableness
standard,28 it clearly disapproved of the review that advisory fees had
received in state courts, under which relief was premised on a show-
ing of "shocking" deviation from industry standards.29 What consti-
tutes a breach of fiduciary duty under this section is, however, enig-
matic. One possible interpretation ° is that there is a range of per-
23. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
24. Id. § 80a-35(b)(1).
25. PPI, supra note 5, at 133-38 (reviewing Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527(D. Colo. 1963); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962); Meiselman v.
Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961).
26. PPI, supra note 5, at 141. For description of this domination, see id. at 145.
See also Note, supra note 1.
27. PPI, supra note 5, at 143-47.
28. The evolution of § 36(b) is described in Note, supra note 22, at 629-30. See
also S. REP. No. 184, supra note 16, at 5. Congress rejected many of the factors which
the SEC had suggested as considerations relevant to the reasonableness of an invest-
ment management fee. For example, the SEC suggested comparison with "comparable"
fees of nonfund managers, e.g., bank trust departments. PPI, supra note 5, at 144.
Section 36(b) does not provide for this. Fund industry practice is the relevant guide.
S. REP. No. 184, supra note 16, at 6. Congress also codified the notion from case law that
shareholder and unaffiliated director ratification are factors in determining whether
the fiduciary obligation of the advisory company had been fulfilled. § 36(b)(2). The
SEC would have omitted this consideration. PPI, supra note 5, at 144.
29. In Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A.2d 602, 610-11 (1962), the court
determined the reasonableness of the fee paid by asking whether there was a shocking
disparity between the fee paid by the fund to the advisory company in question
and the fee paid to the average similarly situated advisory company.
The "shocking" criterion was explained in Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527,
549 (D. Colo. 1963), where the court concluded that comparison of fees to industry
averages is only evidentiary; exceeding such average is not conclusive of the legal ex-
cessiveness of fees, unless such fees exceed the average by a shocking amount.
30. Barriers to federal actions under § 37 of the Investment Company Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1970), were apparently a partial motivation behind the enactment
of § 36(b). See S. REP. No. 184, supra note 16, at 5. Section 37, which provides a
cause of action to a fund shareholder against a person who steals, unlawfully abstracts,
converts or embezzles from a registered investment company, was interpreted at one
time to cover an allegation of a payment by a fund of excessive fees to an investment
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missible fees, encompassing lesser deviations from industry standards
than those permissible under the "shocking" test of state law.31 The
Senate report stated that, with respect to reducing fees to reflect econ-
omies of size, "best industry practice will provide a guide."32 This
test is not likely to approximate closely an arm's length fee, in view
of the complete absence of arm's length bargaining in the industry.33
Without such an arm's length standard, reviewing courts would estab-
lish fees for the entire industry and in effect engage in the nonjudicial
function of ratemaking.3 4 These courts would have no legislative
guide in making important policy trade-offs incident to the process
of setting rates for the industry as a whole.35
2. Section 205
In 1970 Congress brought investment company advisers under the
Investment Advisers Act 6 and simultaneously amended § 205 to ex-
empt these advisers from the Act's general prohibition against fees
based on performance. In order for an adviser of a fund to receive
extra compensation pursuant to a contractual schedule based on "per-
adviser. Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). The Eighth Circuit, however,
reasoned that federal courts were not intended to review corporate relationships under
the Investment Company Act. Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 986 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961).
31. The SEC had interpreted the cases to mean that shareholder ratification pre-
cluded effective judicial inquiry into the reasonableness or fairness of advisory fees.
PPI, supra note 5, at 136. Both the Senate and the House reports accompanying
new § 36(b) also concluded that, under state law, the existence of a breach of fidu-
ciary duty required that fees paid "'shock the conscience of the court.'" S. REP. No.
184, supra note 16, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
The SEC was correct in concluding that state courts would not upset fees unless
they were wasteful or unconscionable, meaning that "no person of ordinary sound
business judgment would be expected to entertain the view that the consideration was
a fair exchange for the value which was given," Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486,
184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962). But it is inaccurate to say that state courts did not inquire
at all into the reasonableness of fees. For example, in Saxe the court found that the
fees paid were reasonable and that they bore a reasonable relationship to expenses.
Id. In Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 564, 170 A.2d 720, 721 (1961), the
court defined the real issue as the reasonableness of compensation. In Acampora
v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 549 (D. Colo. 1963), the court concluded that the issue
was whether the fees are unreasonably high.
32. S. REP. No. 184, supra note 16, at 6.
33. One court suggested the arm's length test, but did not venture to say how
it should be applied. Galfand v. Chestnutt, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,218 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
34. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 487,
184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962). Courts generally refuse to interfere with rate making unless
it passes the threshold of confiscation. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U.S. 38, 53 (1935); Lindheimer v. Illinois Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 164 (1934).35. Although § 36(b) was not intended to involve the courts in rate regulation,
the legislative history indicates that Congress found that investment advisory fees for
the industry as a whole were unreasonably high. S. REP. No. 184, supra note 16, at5, 6. See also Sterrett, Reward for Mutual Fund Sponsor Entrepreneurial Risk, 58
CORNELL L. REv. 195, 208 (1973).
36. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 24, 84 Stat. 1430.
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formance," § 205 requires that the return on the fund's portfolio be
greater than the return on an "appropriate" index of securities prices
or such other measure of investment performance as the SEC may
specify.37
In determining whether an index is appropriate for a particular
investment company, directors of the fund are required by the SEC
to consider such general factors as volatility, diversification of hold-
ings, types of securities owned, and objectives of the investment com-
pany.38 For an investment company that is widely diversified, a broadly
based index of common stocks, weighted by market value, would or-
dinarily be appropriate, though the SEC indicates an index based
upon a relatively few large "blue chip" stocks would not.39 For invest-
ment companies that invest exclusively in a particular "type" of se-
curity, a specialized index, or a broadly based, market-value-weighted
index would be appropriate.40
The SEC comparison standard is thus an index in which risk adjust-
ment is considered only qualitatively in terms of the composition of
the index.41 This approach is theoretically erroneous. Capital market
theory makes clear the necessity of measuring performance in two
dimensions-return and risk.42 Investors derive utility from high re-
37. The statute provides the compensation may be
based on the asset value of the company or fund under management averaged
over a specified period and increasing and decreasing proportionately with the
investment performance of the company or fund . . . in relation to the invest-
ment record of an appropriate index of securities prices or such other measure
of investment performance as the Commission by rule, regulation, or order may
specify.
§ 205 Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970). The details of developing an
index may be found in 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-1 (1973). Calculation of an index's record
is determined by summing the change in the level of the index with the cash dis-
tributions on securities composing the index. Dividends are treated as reinvested quarterly.
38. SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 315 (Apr. 6, 1972).
39. Id.
40. Id. See also Hyperion Fund, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fr. SEC. L. REP.
79,315 (Arthur Lipper Growth Fund Index appropriate for a mutual fund which
invests exclusively in shares of no-load mutual funds).
41. The SEC specifically rejected an index based on considerations of explicit
risk as opposed to the implicit risk considerations in the adopted definition of
the index. SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 315, at note 6 (Apr. 6, 1972).
42. See J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
171 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LORIE & HAMILTON]; W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY
AND CAPITAL MARKETS 27 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SHARPE].
One numerical surrogate for risk is the variance of the return of a portfolio. Use
of the variance of a portfolio as the measure of risk is technically correct only
where the returns of securities occur statistically according to a Gaussian "normal"
distribution or where individuals behave as if maximizing a quadratic utility function.
Samuelson, The Fundamental Approximation Theorem of Portfolio Analysis in Terms
of Means, Variances, and Higher Moments, 37 REV. ECON. STUD. 537 (1970). Returns,
however, are distributed according to the Pareto-Levy function, not the well-behaved
bell curve required by the theory. See Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices,
38 J. Bus. 34 (1965); Fama, Mandelbrot and the Stable Paretian Hypothesis, 36 J. Bus.
420 (1963). And quadratic utility functions have anomalous properties-reduced ab-
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turns, but they also derive disutility from risk. Comparing the return
of a fund portfolio with the return of the index portfolio without
adjusting for differences in risk provides a misleading measure of fund
performance. Even though a fund yields a high return, it may do so
by subjecting an investor to an excessively high risk.
Capital market theory provides a means of ascertaining whether a
portfolio's return adequately compensates a fund shareholder for the
risk incurred.43 Basically the procedure involves comparing the fund
with a hypothetical portfolio consisting of a risk-free asset and the
market portfolio, i.e., the portfolio consisting of all securities held in
proportion to their relative market value.44 The amount of the risk-
free asset held in the hypothetical portfolio is varied to equate the
risk of the fund's portfolio with the comparison portfolio. 45 If the fund
portfolio is riskier than the market portfolio, the market portfolio is
levered until its risk is equated with the portfolio being compared.46
solute and relative risk taking as wealth increases and eventually negative utility of
wealth. Borch, A Note on Uncertainty and Indifference Curves, 36 REV. ECON. STUD.
1 (1969); Feldstein, Mean-Variance Analysis in the Theory of Liquidity Preference
and Portfolio Selection, 36 REV. ECON. STUD. 5 (1969).
Despite these theoretical infirmities evaluation of portfolios in two dimensions-
mean and variance-is a significant advance from a one dimension measure of per-
formance. Tobin, Comment on Borch and Feldstein, 36 REV. EcoN. STUD. 13 (1969).
Measurement of portfolio performance in only two dimensions might also not be too
inaccurate where the underlying probability distribution is in a mathematically well
defined sense "compact." See Samuelson, supra, at 542.
43. See Jensen, Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Invest-
mnent Portfolios, 42 J. Bus. 167 (1969).
44. At present there is no comprehensive market portfolio index, and various sub-
stitutes have been used in its stead with reasonable results. Jensen, supra note 43, used
the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, a market weighted index of 425 industrials, 25
railroads, and 50 utilities, LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 42, at 62. The New York
Stock Exchange Composite Index is perhaps the most complete, being composed of
all stocks listed on the Exchange. Like the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, it is a
value weighted index. It does, however, suffer from its brief span (since 1964). The
ISR, supra note 17, at 410, suggested that the Standard & Poor's 500 Index was
the best available index. See generally Note, The Institutional Investor Disclosure Act:
An Analysis of the Consumer Benefits, 83 YALE L.J. 1271, 1274-76 (1974).
45. A simple numerical example illustrates this process. Suppose the, [risk, return]
characteristics of a fund are [0.5, 8.0] and that of the market and the risk-
free asset are [1.0, 10.0] and [0.0, 5.0], respectively. Then a portfolio composed
of the market and the risk-free asset may be constructed with characteristics [0.5,
7.51. See generally Note, Regulating Risk-Taking by Mutual Funds, 82 YALE L.J.
1305, 1316-17 (1973); Note, supra note 44, at 1274-79. Comparing the return of this
portfolio with that of the fund one can see that the fund has a positive return
due to advice of 0.5.
46. The unavailability of leverage at an interest rate equal to the risk-free rate
creates a number of difficult theoretical problems about the conclusions of the
capital asset pricing model. See generally M. JENsEN, STUmES IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL
MARKETS 18-25 (1972); Jensen, Capital Markets: Theories and Evidence, 3 BELL J. EcoN.
MGT. Sc. 357, 378 (1972).
There seems little doubt, however, that a risk adjusted performance measure is a
significant improvement over a one dimensional test which looks to return alone; cf.
Tobin, supra note 42. And most researchers in the field have assumed the possi-
bility of leveraging at the risk-free rate when evaluating the performance of mutual
funds. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 43.
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The vertical distance above the "baseline" thus traced out is a measure
of the fund manager's ability to "beat the market." 47
The SEC's failure to promulgate a risk-adjusted performance meas-
ure not only gives an illusory measure of a fund manager's perform-
ance, it also may induce excessive risk taking. Under § 205 a fund
manager maximizes its performance fee if the fund's return exceeds
that of the index; there is no reward for minimization of risk.48
The SEC realized that a market index adjusted for risk is an appro-
priate performance standard 49 but it inexplicably failed to adopt the
standard when it promulgated its regulations under § 205. 50 It should
reconsider the adoption of such a standard, especially in view of the
mounting evidence of the usefulness of accounting for risk as well as
return.
Aside from the specification of the proper index, § 205 requires that
rewards and penalties be symmetrical above or below the index. This
performance structure limits fund company ability to bargain for
larger penalties than rewards. Freedom to bargain for larger penalties
might result in an advisory fee schedule which penalizes negative per-
formance. This may more clearly reflect the shareholders' increasing
disutility with performance below the standard.r1
II. Improving Disclosure
The SEC rejected greater or modified disclosure as an effective way
to control advisory fees; it recommended to Congress a judicial reason-
ableness test for these fees.52 There is some evidence, however, that
shareholders can fend for themselves if they are aware of perform-
ance. 3 The SEC should, therefore, in accordance with the policy of
47. Jensen, supra note 43, at 193. See also LoRIE & HAMILTON, supra note 42, at
241-44; SHARPE, supra note 42, at 83.
48. Simulation experiments confirm the theoretical predictions that risk taking is
increased by performance fees structured along § 205 lines. See F. Modigliani & G.
Pogue, A Study of Market Line Investment Performance Fees, April 1973, at 6-10
(working paper, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.) (also on file with
the Yale Law Journal). The reduction of excessive risk taking was one of the goals
of § 205. S. REP. No. 184, supra note 16, at 45.
49. ISR, supra note 17, at 367, 400-10.
50. SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 315, at 6 (Apr. 6, 1972).
51. A related problem involves the relative magnitude of the base fee. The base
fee is usually calculated as a percentage of assets, and the worst possible penalty
under the performance arrangement will not produce a negative total fee. See, e.g.,
ISR, supra note 17, at 256. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7130, at 3
(Apr. 17, 1972), reports that 21 companies had a minimum fee of zero (never negative),
but the remaining sample of 103 companies always received a residual fee irrespective
of performance.
52. PPI, supra note 5, at 147, 148.
53. See, e.g., FOREs, Aug. 15, 1973, at 67 (investors have committed more money
to funds with superior performance records).
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the Investment Company Act54 update disclosure requirements in
order to mitigate the adverse effects of less than adequate information
concerning investment companies.
A. What to Disclose
At present, disclosure requirements under the Securities and Invest-
ment Company Acts do not require any disclosure of performance." 5
The limited requirements on the form of "performance" claims made
in sales literature" are much less restrictive than the regulations gov-
erning construction of performance indexes for § 205 of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act. Performance of the fund's shares may be illustrated
in sales literature by treating dividends as distributed, and capital gains
as reinvested.57 There is no substantive regulation of performance
claims other than the requirement of a few caveats which point to dif-
ferences between the index and the fund's portfolio." The SEC ap-
pears to view the main purpose of disclosure required in investment
company prospectuses as identification of specific instances where an
advisory company may be self-dealing.r" No attempt is made to give
the investor the information necessary to enable him to determine
the value of the payments which are made to the advisory company.
Such information is essential, since the management fee is probably
the largest noninvestment expenditure made by the fund, and its
magnitude is negotiated in a transaction fraught with conflict of in-
terest. Information about performance and the advisory fee should
54. The legislative statement of policy may be found in the Investment Company
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(1) (1970). See also ISR, supra note 17, at xiii, xix.
55. Because the open end mutual funds engage in continuous distribution, they
must comply continuously with 1933 Act registration requirements. The prospectus
requirements may be found in § 10 of the Securities Act and 17 C.F.R. § 271.150
(1973). The contents of the filed registration statement are prescribed by § 24 of
the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24 (1970). The SEC presently requires
updating of performance claims made in sales literature. See SEC Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 2621 (Oct. 31, 1957).
56. The requirements are set out in SEC Investment Company Act Release No.
2621 (Oct. 31, 1957).
57. Compare SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2621 (Oct. 31, 1957), with
17 C.F.R. § 275.205-1 (1973) (requiring dividends to be treated as reinvested quarterly
for purposes of § 205). Since the division of total return between dividends and capital
gains may be different for a fund than for the index, failure to treat dividends as
reinvested may overvalue the performance of a fund with little dividend return.
58. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2621, (n) (Oct. 31, 1957).
59. See, e.g., the items required by Form N-8B-1 (Registration Statement of Man-
agement Investment Company): items 13 (Persons in Control Relationship with
Registrant), 23 (Business and Other Connections of Investment Advisers and Their
Management), and 25 (Remuneration of Certain Affiliated Persons); and the items
required by Form N-1R (Annual Report of Management Investment Company): items
1.12 (Remuneration of Directors, Officers and Members of Advisory Board), 1.13 (Re-
muneration of Certain Other Affiliated Persons) and 1.20 (Business and Other Con-
nections of Management and of Investment Adviser). [1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
FM.. SEc. L. REP. 51,293, 51,963.
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fall within prospectus definitions of material information since it
would influence the decision of a rational investor to purchase the
security.60
Capital market theory provides some guidance about the informa-
tion necessary to evaluate a fund and its management. The risk and
return of the fund are, of course, crucial, as is the return on the com-
parison standard-the market index adjusted by combining the risk-
free asset to equal the risk of the fund portfolio. This information
enables an investor to distinguish superior performance from luck.
The risk-adjusted measure of performance should be part of the syn-
thesis of the data required to be disclosed.61
Performance as well should be measured over a suitable period of
time. There are two conflicting policies in choosing a period over
which to measure performance. First, the period should be sufficiently
long that random influences are minimized. Second, the period should
be short enough to be responsive to changes in the performance of the
fund due to new advisory capabilities. To reconcile these conflicting
goals, disclosure of performance both for long and short periods could
be required.
The SEC should also consider disclosure of the return on the fund
less the risk-free return per unit risk. This synthesis of data would
provide the shareholder an easy method of comparing the possible
return at different risk levels.62 By allocating part of his or her funds
to a risk-free asset or by borrowing in combination with purchasing
the fund, the investor could assemble a portfolio with risk and return
which most closely matched his or her preferences.6 3
B. Timing for Disclosure
A key element of any disclosure scheme is timing: The pertinent
information must reach an investor early in the decisionmaking proc-
60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1973).
61. Synthesization has been required for earnings per share figures, SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4910 (June 18, 1968). The general trend is toward data synthesis
which would permit of comparisons among companies. SEC Securities Act Rekase No.
5342 (Dec. 18, 1972).
62. The possibility that an unsophisticated investor might consider this figure a
measure of absolute superiority suggests the inclusion of caveats alerting the investor
of the necessity to consider his or her own risk preferences.
63. See LORIE 9: HAMILTON, supra note 42, at 236; SHARPE, supra note 42, at 154-60.
Sharpe points out two possible measures: return minus risk-free return divided by
variability (total variance), or return minus risk-free return divided by Nolatility
(market covariance).
Sharpe points out that the variability measure is appropriate when the portfolio
represents an investor's total investment. SHARPE at 154t. This Note favors total variance
measures. Sophisticated investors who view the fund as only a part of their total
diversified investment are not the persons primarily in need of protection from
misleading performance measures which do not take account of risk.
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ess in order for such information to affect the decision to buy or sell.
The inertia of prior deliberations might obscure the usefulness of
information received later. In order to guarantee the receipt of in-
formation early in the decisionmaking process, the Securities Act man-
dates delivery of a prospectus which meets the requirements of § 10
once a written offer to sell is made. 4 Mutual funds argue that the
Securities Act should not apply to them.65 They point to their relative
safety and to the fact that they compete with other modes of invest-
ment-life insurance, bank accounts-which are not subject to the
Securities Act. 6 The SEC has responded to these arguments by ex-
empting certain advertisements from the definition of offer to sell 7
and by permitting funds to use a summary prospectus.08 These
changes permit brief descriptions of the activities of a fund to appear
in advertisements intended to reach the general public. Previously
such advertisements had been permitted to refer only to the statutory
prospectus for such information. 0 The new summary prospectus may
be distributed with other sales literature, but it does not satisfy the
prospectus delivery requirements. 70 The new summary prospectus
must admonish potential buyers to examine the full prospectus before
buying, and the full prospectus must be readily available.71
The availability of the full prospectus does not, however, mean that
the content of the summary prospectus or the advertisements describ-
ing the fund are unimportant. Disclosure of performance should be
made whenever performance claims are asserted, as, for example,
when a company chooses to display its record of performance in a gen-
eral advertisement.72 The SEC should also mandate use of the risk-
64. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1970).
65. Romanski, The Role of Advertising on the Mutual Fund Industry, 13 B.C.
IND. & Cos,. L. REv. 959, 1001 (1972).
66. Id. at 1001 n. 227.
67. Rule 135A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.135a (1973) (generic advertising). An expansion of
the "tombstone" ad is Rule 134(a)(3) iii, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3)(iii) (1973). Further
expansion is being considered, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5357 (Jan. 17, 1973).
68. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5248 (May 9, 1972); Rule 434A, [1971-72 Transfer
Binder] CCH FrED. SEc. L. REt,. j 78,760. This rule modified the previous exclusion of in-
vestment companies from the generally permitted use of such ads. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.434a (1973); Securities Act of 1933 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1970).
69. For a discussion of the restrictiveness of these ads, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1570 nA (1972).
70. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(bX2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1970), requires delivery
of a statutory prospectus upon delivery of the securities.
71. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5248 (May 9, 1972).
72. Where no performance is asserted by the company, a general advertisement
does not seem to be a suitable point at which greater performance disclosure should
be required. Such ads educate people by making them aware of investment oppor-
tunities in mutual funds. The SEC should allow a "tombstone" ad broad enough to
arouse interest, but it should not impose requirements of disclosure so expensive as
to make the broad dissemination of the ad impossible. For the contrary position, see
Romanski, supra note 65, at 1016.
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adjusted measure of performance.7 3 This would provide an accurate
and uniform measure of an investment manager's ability.
As more investors base their purchases on an accurate measure of
performance, funds which spend an excess amount of money on non-
productive research and trading will be penalized by net redemptions
of utility-maximizing shareholders. By contrast, funds which minimize
costs should, in the long run, outperform the market and attract the
capital of informed investors. This competition should lead to a re-
duction in the size of advisory fees as a percentage of total net assets.
Although the result can be tested empirically only after the regulation
is tried, enhancing competition through dissemination of accurate
performance measures should be preferred to direct methods of con-
trol which are uncertain both as to method and results.o4
III. Enhancing Shareholder Control
The 1970 Investment Company Act Amendments rejected as a regu-
latory approach not only disclosure, but also the pre-1970 strategy of
requiring investment company structures which permit shareholder
participation in the fund's decisionmaking 75 and which assure that
some members of the board of directors will have no direct interest
in the advisory company.76
With respect to shareholder voting control the SEC found that the
right of shareholders to approve an advisory contract "may well have
served to discourage advisers from charging fees at rates higher than
the traditional 0.50 rate. ' 77 The SEC concluded, however, that because
the rate failed to fall from the industrywide one half of one percent
of company assets, the shareholders were unable to demand anything
better through their power of approval of the advisory contract.78
An equally plausible explanation is that shareholders do not have
the opportunity to approve advisory contracts often enough to exert
73. Full disclosure of performance might also be required in certain circumstances
when an investor andi a fund salesperson engage in oral discussion of mutual fund
securities. Although the Securities Act does not regulate oral solicitations once a
registration statement has become effective, see Lobell, Revision of the Securities Act,
48 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 322-24 (1948), regulation of oral solicitation after registration
might be an appropriate subject of self-regulation by the exchanges or the National
Association of Security Dealers (NASD). It would be similar to suitability rules. See
generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 69, at 810-11.
74. See note 53 supra for evidence that shareholders do purchase those funds which
perform best. See also Note, supra note 44, at 1273.
75. See pp. 1476-77 supra for examples of pre-1970 structural guarantees.
76. See note 12 supra.
77. PPI, supra note 5, at 128.
78. Id. at 130.
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control. The Investment Company Act requires shareholder approval
of an advisory contract only once.7T Long after this original approval,
growth of the fund may make the one half of one percent rate unrea-
sonable. Shareholders have no opportunity to express disapproval 0
except as such disapproval could be expressed through election of
directors."'
This barrier to shareholder control could be overcome by a statu-
tory amendment requiring that shareholders vote annually on the in-
vestment advisory contract. Even without such an amendment the
SEC could probably exert some pressure for annual approval of the
contract through its power to bring an action under § 36(b) of the In-
vestment Company Act. Section 36(b)(2) provides that a court should
consider shareholder ratification of a contract in determining whether
directors have breached their fiduciary duties.
One objection to frequent shareholder approval of contracts is that
it may produce changes which are not desired by minority share-
holders. The desire that past policies be continued is important in
most corporations since a shareholder is traditionally believed to have
an interest in the joint venture to which he or she has committed
capital.8 2 In fund companies the strength of this interest is weakened
by the right of redemption at a highly accurate determination of fair
market value of net assets per share.83 Redemption, in this situation,
may be viewed as a continuous appraisal right.84
The SEC makes a second argument against enhanced shareholder
79. The Investment Company Act § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970), provides
that all advisory contracts must be approved by a majority of the outstanding voting
securities. Renewals, which are required annually, may be made either by the board
of directors or the stockholders, id. 80a-15(c). See note 81 infra for an example of a
tenacious postponement of shareholder ratification.
80. The Commission concedes that the one half of one percent rate at which most
advisory fees are calculated is reasonable for smaller funds. PPI, supra note 5, at 148
& 149.
81. See Investment Company Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (1970). Only substantial
changes in advisory contracts must be submitted to the shareholders for approval.
See, e.g., Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963) (contract in effect
for twenty years without shareholder ratification).
82. In fact, at common law such interest was so dominant that sales of substan-
tially all the assets of a corporation were not valid unless such sales had unanimous
stockholder approval. See, e.g., Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., 10 Del. Ch. 371,
377, 93 A. 380, 383 (1915). See also Annot., 79 A.L.R. 624 (1932). Appraisal was a
statutory protection provided to replace the common law absolute right when statutes
overruled the common law prohibition on such sales. In re Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178
N.E. 776 (1931). See note 96 infra for a contrary view of this appraisal right.
83. The requirements as to value determination are set out in 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l
(1973).
84. The redemption right is not quite as attractive in the case of so-called "load
funds." The original sales load charge is somewhat higher than on sales of other
securities. Computed as a percentage of total share cost, commission load charges range
from seven to nine percent. PPI, supra note 5, at 52-54.
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control.85 The argument is that shareholder rejection of an advisory
contract would leave a fund with no adviser. This might not be an
intolerable state for a short period of time. A well diversified fund
will attain a certain level of performance without any research guid-
ance. But assuming that a fund must have an adviser at all times,
directors need not wait until expiration of the old advisory contract
to seek shareholder approval of a new one. If renewal approval is
sought well before the expiration date of the old contract, the directors
should be able to find a substitute adviser if necessary. Directors might
also provide in proxy solicitation for approval of an interim contract
in the event that the long-term contract is unacceptable to the share-
holders. Another alternative would be internal management during
an interim period without a contract.
In view of the profitability of managing a fund, it seems unlikely
that a fund would go very long without a contract before competitors
submit bids on managing the fund.86 By restoring to shareholders
their economic bargaining power-termination of the advisory con-
tract-and by requiring directors to entertain competitive bids for the
position of investment adviser, contract negotiation might more truly
resemble arm's length bargaining. Such a result would be consistent
with the lower advisory fees for accounts of a similar size of corporate,
individual and other institutional investors.8 7
These solutions are much more attractive than the limited share-
holder input registered through election of directors.88 Even directors
not affiliated with the fund's advisers may be persuaded by the ad-
visory company personnel to adopt a view similar to that of the ad-
visory company. Moreover, there is no reason for shareholders to de-
sire a division of responsibility for the management of the company80
between two sets of persons-the advisory company and the fund's
own staff. Such division of responsibility would generate redundant
expenses and deprive the shareholders of the advisory company's ex-
pertise within the fund.90 The noninterested directors would be just
85. Id. at 129.
86. Id. at 124, shows an attractive investment of a range of 13 percent to 60 percent
profit margin and in absolute terms up to .$10 million profit per year.
87. See ISR, supra note 17, at 23, 210. See also id. at xiv, where competitive pres-
sures were cited as a reason for not needing to extend § 205 to other institutional
investors.
88. The SEC itself takes the position that election of directors has little effect on
the advisory contract. PPI, supra note 5, at 130. Interested person is defined in § 2(c)(l9)
of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c)(19) (1970). See also id. § 80a-2(a)(3)
(1970) (definition of "affiliated" persons).
89. Cf. Lobell, supra note 6, at 206.
90. Interesting examples of duplication and confusion which occur in investment
companies' expenses may be found at PPI, sufwa note 5, at 91.
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other agents for which a method of assuring responsibility to the share-
holders would have to be developed. 91
The SEC also raised doubts about the wisdom of shareholder con-
trol over advisory contracts because of the imperfections of the proxy
system of voting. 2 These imperfections may, however, be partially
eliminated. First, under present law, the SEC could require that the
proxies explicitly notify shareholders of their opportunity to express
dissatisfaction with the advisory contract and alert them to the im-
portance of literature available to them0 3 which includes the disclosure
items . 4
Second, Congress should amend the statute9 to provide that the
shareholders be given the opportunity on all contract votes to express
three different choices with regard to entering a new contract with
the advisory company: (1) that the directors should accept the contract
as it is written; (2) that they should renegotiate the contract; and
(3) that they shoald seek a new adviser as if no special relationship
existed with the old adviser.
These last two mandates to the directors would present a conflict
of interest for the interested members of the board. Thus only non-
interested directors should participate in renegotiation when share-
holders make the second choice. The last choice is a decision to sever
special relations with the advisory company. If the shareholders so
vote, the interested directors should be required to resign, noninter-
ested directors should nominate successors for those resigning, and
91. The development of such control is consistent with pre-1970 regulation which
looked to full shareholder equity participation to control advisory fees. See Investment
Company Act § l(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(2) (1970).
Those readers skeptical of shareholder ability to control corporate decisions should
keep in mind that the decision discussed in the text is narrowly circumscribed to the
issue of satisfaction with the performance of the fund and hence the value of the
advisory services. Given proper information and a standardized computation, dissatis-
faction on an issue this crucial and requiring no more judgment than the original
decision to invest in a fund may be expressed effectively.
92. PPI, supra note 5, at 128.
93. This could be required as a regulation similar to 17 C.F.R. § 270.20a-20 (1973)
which requires that certain information regarding the investment adviser and the ad-
visory contract be furnished as part of the proxy material. Another suitable vehicle
of disclosure is the annual report which must be sent to shareholders prior to the
solicitation of proxies by rules under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 78n (1970) and § 20 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20 (1970). Its
lorm is prescribed by the SEC. See Form N-IR, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 51,961.
94. The terms of the advisory contract should be disclosed as presently required.
17 C.F.R. § 270.20a-2 (1973).
95. The actual choices suggested in the text could fit well into regulations under§ 14 of the Securities Exchange Act. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. 240.14a(b) (1973) (providing
for an opportunity to express disapproval on a management proposal); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (1973) (providing an opportunity for shareholder proposals). The provi-
sions for resignation of directors and renegotiation of contracts seem to be outside the
scope of § 14 or § 20 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-14, -20 (1970).
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the new board should seek an adviser.96 Since the noninterested direc-
tors will be operating under a specific mandate of the shareholders,
their actions will be under the direct control of shareholders who
possess an economic interest in the fund. 7
Conclusion
The 1970 Amendments to the Investment Company Act and the
Investment Advisers Act departed from past approaches to regulation
of fees paid to investment advisers of mutual funds through share-
holder control and complete disclosure. The amendments regulate
fees by allowing the courts to test on an ad hoc basis their reasonable-
ness at the behest of shiareholders and by establishing a performance
fee structure which was thought to be substantially correct. The courts
should not be used to regulate advisory company fees because of the
nature of the judicial function. Furthermore, the substantive regula-
tion regarding performance fee structure, even if properly imple-
mented by the SEC, does not control the dynamic process of setting
fees and is too restrictive to allow rational bargaining over fee struc-
ture.
The SEC should act under present law to improve disclosure and
to make shareholder control more meaningful. Legislation is sug-
gested which would give shareholders an opportunity to exert mean-
ingful direct control over fees paid to advisory companies. This Note's
suggestions should promote a fee structure similar to one which would
be determined by arm's length bargaining between a fund and ad-
visory company without encountering the problems of the 1970
Amendments.
96. At this point the old adviser should not be foreclosed from being the choice
of the board, but should the board choose this adviser and a new contract be re-
jected by the shareholders, the board should exclude the old adviser from further
consideration. It seems essential to any meaningful shareholder control that the ad-
visory group not be allowed to continually submit proposal after proposal to the
amorphous shareholder group of a mutual fund, which group might yield to the
sheer persistence and futility of resistance.
97. A new adviser once found should be allowed to nominate successor directors to
run against a noninterested slate to give the shareholders an opportunity to place
control in one person. This particular suggestion does not conflict in any way with
proposals such as S.4071, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), which would require a nonin-
terested board for three years following the sale of control of the advisory company.
Such proposals are principally concerned with the problems associated with voluntary
sales of advisory office. See Sterrett, supra note 35, at 250.
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